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Why	Britain’s	habit	of	cherry-picking	criminal	justice
policy	cannot	survive	Brexit
The	European	Arrest	Warrant	is	important	to	Theresa	May.	But,	as	Auke	Willems	(LSE)	explains,
it	will	be	difficult	to	negotiate	the	pan-European	security	co-operation	she	wants	unless	Britain	is
prepared	to	cross	the	‘red	line’	of	recognising	the	European	Court	of	Justice,	as	well	as	the	Charter
of	Fundamental	Rights.
Cooperation	on	matters	of	police	and	criminal	law	–	or	security	cooperation,	as	the	UK	government
prefers	to	call	it	–	is	high	on	the	list	of	Brexit	priorities.	In	particular,	the	European	Arrest	Warrant
(EAW),	the	EU’s	flagship	instrument	for	fast-track	extradition,	is	highly	valued	by	Theresa	May.	The	government	has
given	some	insight	into	how	it	wants	this	relationship	to	take	shape	in	a	Future	Partnership	Paper	on	Security,	law
enforcement	and	criminal	justice,	as	well	as	in	May’s	speech	at	the	Munich	Security	Conference	where	she
underlined	the	importance	of	cooperation	in	this	area:	“Extradition	outside	the	European	Arrest	Warrant	can	cost	four
times	as	much	and	take	three	times	as	long.”	While	these	put	forward	a	strong	case	for	why	cooperation	should
continue,	they	leave	much	to	be	desired	in	terms	of	how	this	should	be	achieved.
Absent	from	public	debate,	but	not	from	the	negotiating	table
Belgian	police	in	Brussels,	2013.	Photo:	Antonio	Ponte	via	a	CC-BY-SA	2.9	licence
Surprisingly,	criminal	justice	cooperation	has	received	relatively	little	attention	in	public	debate	when	compared	to	the
blockbuster	files	of	the	divorce	bill,	the	Irish	border,	citizens’	rights,	and	future	trade	relations.	Surprising,	because
the	interests	at	stake	concern	such	fundamental	values	as	security,	freedom	and	rights.	But	despite	the	lack	of	
public	attention,	it	is	no	surprise	that	criminal	justice	is	one	of	the	government’s	priority	areas.	It	is,	after	all,	a	core
task	of	a	state	to	provide	security	for	its	citizens,	and	in	a	rapidly	globalising	world	it	is	impossible	to	do	this	alone.
Certain	forms	of	serious	crime	are	cross-border	by	nature	–	drug-trafficking,	human	trafficking,	and	terrorism	–	but
also	‘new’	forms	of	crime	such	as	cybercrime	necessitate	a	joint	and	coordinated	response.	The	prospect	that	the	UK
would	fall	outside	the	EU’s	criminal	justice	framework	and	become	a	safe	haven	for	criminals	and	terrorists	is	not	an
appealing	thought.
The	UK’s	central,	and	privileged,	position	in	EU	criminal	law
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The	UK	has	long	been	one	of	the	main	drivers	of	the	EU’s	criminal	justice	policy.	Although	reluctantly	–	there	has
never	been	much	desire	to	give	up	sovereignty	regarding	criminal	law,	which	touches	on	the	core	of	statehood	–	the
UK	saw	an	urgent	need	for	European	states	to	enhance	cooperation	in	criminal	justice	matters	in	the	face	of
increasing	cross-border	crime,	not	least	because	of	the	freedoms	the	EU	guarantees.	Therefore	the	UK	came	up
with	the	idea	of	transferring	the	principle	of	mutual	recognition,	which	had	proven	successful	in	the	internal	market,	to
the	area	of	criminal	law.	In	1999,	the	Tampere	European	Council	proclaimed	that	mutual	recognition	was	to	become
the	‘cornerstone	of	judicial	cooperation	in	criminal	justice’.	It	still	is	today,	and,	despite	difficulties,	the	success	of	the
EAW	–	at	least	from	a	law	enforcement	perspective	–	is	undeniable.	The	latest	frontier	in	the	mutual	recognition	era
is	the	European	Investigation	Order	on	the	gathering	and	exchange	of	evidence,	and	UK	law	enforcement	is	more
than	keen	to	participate	in	this	instrument.	The	UK	has	moreover	proven	a	major	player	in	information	and
intelligence	exchange	and	operational	cooperation	through	platforms	and	databases	as	Europol	(the	current	director
of	Europol	is	British)	and	the	Schengen	Information	System.
In	addition	to	successfully	pushing	forward	mutual	recognition	instead	of	more	intrusive	harmonisation,	the	UK	has
long	enjoyed	opt-outs	regarding	justice	and	home	affairs	matters,	which	culminated	in	a	broad	arrangement	under
the	Lisbon	Treaty	that	effectively	allowed	the	UK	to	opt	in/out	of	any	measure	it	desires.	This	arrangement,	also
referred	to	as	cherry-picking,	has	indeed	been	a	rather	sweet	deal	for	the	UK	and	allows	it	to	participate	in	those
measures	that	are	regarded	as	domestically	beneficial,	and	avoid	anything	else.	That	deal	will	now	end.	Arguably	–
more	than	in	any	other	area	–	the	UK	has	managed	to	shape	EU	criminal	law	to	its	desires.	So	it	seems	fair	to
conclude	that	if	the	EU	were	merely	a	‘security	union’,	Brexit	would	never	have	happened.
A	shared	interest	in	continuing	cooperation,	but	what	about	trust?
The	desire	to	maintain	close	security	ties	is	therefore	high	on	the	UK’s	agenda,	with	an	emphasis	on	law
enforcement	measures	like	the	EAW.	The	EU	in	turn	also	wishes	to	maintain	as	close	a	relationship	as	possible	with
the	UK	across	justice	and	security	(see	for	example	the	European	Council’s	Guidelines).	Could	this	be	one	area
where	an	early	deal	could	be	reached,	based	on	shared	interests?	The	answer	should	be	yes.	The	interests	at	stake
are	simply	too	high	for	political	games,	and	this	is	far	from	a	zero-sum	game.	However,	there	are	a	number	of	snags
that	make	it	more	complicated	than	it	might	seem.
The	high	degree	of	cooperation	within	the	EU	on	criminal	justice	matters	is	enabled	by	the	presumption	that	all
Member	States	comply	fully	with	fundamental	rights,	including	laws	on	data	protection,	and	more	broadly	comply	with
the	EU	acquis.	Two	key	instruments	are	the	EU’s	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	and	the	European	Convention	on
Human	Rights	(ECHR).	In	terms	of	EU	criminal	law	this	is	known	as	the	presumption	of	mutual	trust.	The	EU	has
taken	active	steps	to	strengthen	this	trust,	for	example	by	adopting	measures	enhancing	fair	trial	rights	(here	the	UK
has	a	mixed	record	as	it	has	opted	in	to	some	of	these	measures,	but	not	all),	and	other	flanking	measures	to
minimise	differences	between	national	legal	systems.
A	further	pillar	to	guarantee	mutual	trust	is	the	jurisdiction	of	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	(CJEU),
which	is	tasked	with	keeping	Member	States	in	line	with	EU	laws,	but	also	to	safeguard	the	balance	between	rights
and	enforcement.	The	EU’s	Area	of	Freedom,	Security	and	Justice	(which	is	far	from	complete)	aims	to	become	a
balanced	judicial	space,	under	the	guardianship	of	the	Commission,	and	with	the	ultimate	supervision	of	the	CJEU.
The	emphasis	on	security	rather	than	justice
This	reality	might	pose	a	number	of	difficulties	for	the	UK	government.	The	EU	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	will
not	form	part	of	retained	EU	law,	and	the	future	of	the	ECHR	is	at	best	uncertain	(dubbed	‘Brexit	2’	by	Estella	Baker).
Moreover,	the	protection	of	data,	required	for	access	to	EU	databases,	is	a	concern	on	the	EU	side.	More	broadly,
the	terminology	used	by	the	government,	which	emphasises	security	rather	than	freedom	and	justice,	indicates	that
negotiators	are	less	interested	in	the	latter.
This	may	very	well	prove	the	main	stumbling	block.	An	absolute	prerequisite	for	applying	instruments	as	the	EAW	is
mutual	trust,	which	cannot	be	ensured	by	a	third	state	if	it	does	not	comply	with	the	EU’s	Charter,	nor	any	of	its
procedural	rights	measures	or	the	other	relevant	EU	acquis.	To	illustrate	this,	the	EAW	deal	with	Norway	and
Iceland,	two	states	that	are	within	the	single	market	and	Schengen	(the	UK	will	not	be	in	either),	took	ten	years	to
negotiate	and	is	still	not	operational.
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Moreover,	if	the	jurisdiction	of	the	CJEU	is	indeed	a	red	line	–	as	argued	by	some	hard-line	Brexiters	–	this	will	be
difficult	to	reconcile.	If	two	parties	sign	an	agreement,	this	will	raise	issues	of	interpretation	for	which	a	judicial	body	is
needed.	It	appears	from	May’s	speech	in	Munich	as	though	that	she	has	opened	the	door	(albeit	reluctantly)	to
accepting	CJEU	jurisdiction	where	necessary.
Overall,	no	matter	what	form	an	ultimate	cooperation	agreement	will	take,	it	will	be	less	than	what	is	currently	in
place:	an	‘EAW	minus’	at	best.	How	much	it	differs	will	depend	upon	the	commitment	the	UK	is	willing	to	make
to	meet	EU	fundamental	rights	law.	As	Valsamis	Mitsilegas	has	noted,	this	has	created	the	paradoxical
situation	where	in	order	to	maintain	current	levels	of	cooperation,	the	UK	might	have	to	accept	more	EU	law	than	it
currently	does	as	a	Member	State.
An	early	end	to	UK	participation	in	the	EAW?
The	recent	case	of	O’Connor	might	serve	to	show	how	central	the	EU’s	acquis	is	to	the	EAW,	and	the	consequent
impact	of	Brexit.	The	Irish	Supreme	Court	refused	to	surrender	Joseph	O’Connor	to	the	UK	due	to	its	concerns	about
Brexit,	in	essence	because	his	rights	could	be	curtailed	once	the	UK	leaves	the	EU	(the	sentence	sought	would
continue	post-Brexit).	Accordingly,	the	Irish	Supreme	Court	referred	the	matter	to	the	CJEU.	This	case	will	be	a	major
test,	as	the	CJEU	could	potentially	render	the	precious	EAW	ineffective	already	as	of	now,	rather	than	after	Brexit.	It
underlines	the	need	to	find	a	solution	that	satisfies	the	rights	requirements	that	are	needed	to	operate	the	EU’s
enhanced	model	of	cooperation	in	criminal	justice	matters.
Considering	the	difficulties	that	lie	ahead	in	reaching	a	deal	acceptable	to	both	the	UK	and	the	EU27	which	would	not
deteriorate	either	security	or	rights,	the	words	of	Wolfgang	Ischinger	at	the	Munich	Security	Conference	cut	right	to
the	chase:	‘Things	would	be	so	much	easier	if	you	stayed’.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Auke	Willems	is	a	Fellow	in	EU	Law	at	the	LSE’s	European	Institute.	He	tweets	@WillemsAuke
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